Showing 1 - 10 of 18
We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540822
Moral values influence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially significant instance is the case of moral values concerning work effort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572208
The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823865
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in … matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823950
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823951
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987
-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144867
We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574232
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592869
We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set … matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498408