This study uses a multiagent system to investigate how sealed-bid auction results vary across twodimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value...

Consider a two-person economy in which allocative efficiency is independent of distribution but cardinality of the agents' utility functions precludes transferable utility. I show that both agents either benefit or lose with any change of production possibilities under the Nash Bargaining and...

We use nonparametric regression analysis to investigate the relationship between the effective tax rate and the relative size of the underground economy, using New Zealand data. The theoretical underpinnings of such a relationship are established by extending some of the predictions of the...

We use nonparametric regression analysis to investigate the relationship between the effective tax rate and the relative size of the underground economy, using New Zealand data. The theoretical underpinnings of such a relationship are established by extending some of the predictions of the...

This study uses a multiagent system to investigate English auctions with two-dimensional value signals and agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at...

This study uses a multiagent system to determine which payment rule provides the most revenue in Treasury auctions that are based on Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment...

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative auction research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents and provides an experimental environment that is under the experimenter's complete control. Simulations...

Consider a two-person economy in which allocative efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents' utility functions precludes transferable utility (a property I call “Almost TU”). I show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for both...