Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

The article analyzes the Dynkin (1975) stochastic model of economic equilibrium. We solve a question regarding this model that was open for a long time. We provide arguments yielding a complete proof of Dynkin's existence theorem for equilibrium paths.

This paper studies a competitive market model for trading indivisible commodities. Commodities can be desirable or undesirable. Agents' preferences depend on the bundle of commodities and the quantity of money they hold. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities in money. Using the...

I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard regularity conditions. I also...

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty E-core. Our main result is...

The “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded ; recall, for example, the diamonds and water paradox. In this paper, furthering research initiated in Kelso and Crawford (1982, Econometrica 50, 1483-1504) for matching models, we demonstrate a law of scarcity for cores and approximate...

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without side payments and provide three no emptiness of approximate core theorems for games in parameterized collections. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the...

We develop a theory of decision making and General Equilibrium for contingent markets when incomplete preferences are generated by second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). Demand, Pareto-optima and equilibria dominance are fully characterized. Demands and equilibrium allocations are...

Nous dressons dans ce papier un bilan de la littérature sur le lien empirique entre libéralisation commerciale et développement selon trois acceptions différentes du « développement » et de l’impératif de justice que ce terme sous-entend dans les négociations à l’OMC. Rebaptisé «...