A new model of strategic network formation is developed and analyzed, where an agent's investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to...

Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...

I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski's fixed-point theorem, and of a much-used extension of Tarski's fixed-point theorem to set- valued maps.

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure...

This paper presents a model of local network effects in which agents connected in a social network each value adoption by a heterogeneous subset of others, and have incomplete information about the structure and strength of adoption complementarities between all other agents. I show that the...

We present a model of network formation where entering nodes find other nodes to link to both completely at random and through search of the neighborhoods of these randomly met nodes. We show that this model exhibits the full spectrum of features that have been found to characterize large...

We propose a simple non-cooperative mechanism of network formation in cost spanning tree problems. The only subgame equilibrium payoff is efficient. Moreover, we extend the result to the case of budget restrictions. The equilibrium payoff can them be easily adapted to the framework of Steiner trees.

I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.

This paper studies the formation of networks among individuals. The focus is on the compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. The paper reviews and synthesizes some previous results on the subject, and also provides new results on the existence...

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a...