Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems

We propose a simple non-cooperative mechanism of network formation in cost spanning tree problems. The only subgame equilibrium payoff is efficient. Moreover, we extend the result to the case of budget restrictions. The equilibrium payoff can them be easily adapted to the framework of Steiner trees.

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Year of publication:	2004-03-05
Authors:	Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Vidal-Puga, Juan
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	efficiency \| cost spanning tree problem \| cost allocation \| network formation \| subgame perfect equilibrium \| budget restrictions \| Steiner trees

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinXP; to print on HP;
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005062358