Showing 1 - 10 of 390
private and common valuations as special cases. We show that the key determinant of bidders' surplus (and implicitly auction … format of the auction matters. If bidders have constant marginal utilities for objects up to some limit, then uniform price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135082
We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It … fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062361
for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118539
Consider an auction in which $k$ identical objects are sold to $n>k$ bidders who each have a value for one object which … not prohibitively high, then the equilibrium price in a uniform price auction will not aggregate private information, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135078
This paper studies an auction model in which one of the bidders, the insider, has better information about a common … also show that the insider can protect the value of her private information by hiding her presence in the auction to the … outsiders. Finally, we analyze the implications of information revelation on the efficiency of the auction and on the auctioneer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561808
In sender--receiver games high--quality types can distinguish themselves from low--quality types by sending a costly signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We examine equilibria where medium types separate themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550943
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118623
This paper develops a model of pricing and advertising in a matching environment with capacity constrained sellers. Sellers' expenditure on directly informative advertising attracts consumers only probabilistically. Consumers who happen to observe advertisements randomize over the advertised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076903
the auction format as revenue equivalence cannot be expected to hold. From a theoretical viewpoint, Myerson's (1981 … more practical solution to the seller's problem is suggested by the "Amsterdam auction," where a premium is offered to … encourage weak bidders to compete aggressively. This auction format, which has been used to sell houses in Amsterdam for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077067
This article reports the results of a market experiment designed to test the predictions of the constant relative risk aversion model and to study the importance of information feedback in repeated first-price sealed-bid auctions. The data reveal that introduction of price information feedback...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556692