Showing 1 - 10 of 422
We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. -- beauty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614296
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580461
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001606870
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001676686
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001628515
Self regulation is a mechanism of quality vigilance that is frequently used in credence good industries. The providers in these markets generally form a Self Regulated Organization (SRO), composed by some members of the industry, whose main job is to convince consumers through an active...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129771
Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129805
In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common knowledge of the type structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal-form games in which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129808