Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

This paper studies a competitive market model for trading indivisible commodities. Commodities can be desirable or undesirable. Agents' preferences depend on the bundle of commodities and the quantity of money they hold. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities in money. Using the...

Sunk Costs and Market Structure bridges the gap between the new generation of game theoretic models that has dominated the industrial organization literature recently and the traditional empirical agenda of the subject as embodied in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm developed by Joe S....

I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard regularity conditions. I also...

Game theory has come to dominate industrial organization economics, but business strategists continue to debate its usefulness. So far, empirical work on the application of game theory to business strategy has been too limited to force a consensus. As a (partial) remedy, Games Businesses Play...

This book bridges optimal control theory and economics, discussing ordinary differential equations, optimal control, game theory, and mechanism design in one volume. Technically rigorous and largely self-contained, it provides an introduction to the use of optimal control theory for...

Volume 1: Econometric General Equilibrium Modeling presents an econometric approach to general equilibrium modeling of the impact of economic policies. Earlier approaches were based on the "calibration" of general equilibrium models to a single data point. The obvious disadvantage of calibration...

In The Equilibrium Manifold, noted economic scholar and major contributor to the theory of general equilibrium Yves Balasko argues that, contrary to what many textbooks want readers to believe, the study of the general equilibrium model did not end with the existence and welfare theorems of the...

The assumption of internationally identical factor intensity techniques may be one of the major causes of the HOV model's poor performance. To relax this assumption, detailed input-output data are required to compute the factor intensity techniques used in different countries; however, these...