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Glazer, Amihai; Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization’s performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190898

Information in Conflicts

Wärneryd, Karl - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2000

We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649250

Producers bargaining over a quality standard

Argenton, Cédric - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2005

We study an asymmetric information model in which two firms are active on a market where buyers only observe the … their qualities, they bargain over a perfectly enforcable minimum quality standard. The bargaining outcome is given by the … decreases with the low-cost producer's cost of production, showing that the latter's bargaining position can be enhanced by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649261