Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...

Minimum variance and equally-weighted portfolios have recently prompted great interest both from academic researchers and market practitioners, as their construction does not rely on expected average returns and is therefore assumed to be robust. In this paper, we consider a related approach,...

We consider a model in which any investment opportunity is described in terms of cash flows. We don't assume that there is a numéraire, enabling investors to transfer wealth through time; the time horizon is not supposed to be finite and the investment opportunities are not specifically related...

In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables (or issues). Dealing with such domains leads to the following well-known dilemma: either ask the voters to vote separately on each issue,...

This work consists of two parts. In the first one, we study a model where the assets are investment opportunities, which are completely described by their cash-flows. Those cash-flows follow some binomial processes and have the following property called stationarity: it is possible to initiate...

In many practical contexts where a number of agents have to find a common decision, the votes do not come all together at the same time. In such situations, we may want to preprocess the information given by the subelectorate (consisting of the voters who have expressed their votes) so as to...

Voting on multiple related issues is an important and difficult problem. The key difficulty is that the number of alternatives is exponential in the number of issues, and hence it is infeasible for the agents to rank all the alternatives. A simple approach is to vote on the issues one at a...

The paper provides an introduction to exterior differential calculus, and an application to the standard problem of the characterization of aggregate demand in an economy in which the number of agents is smaller than the number of goods.

This paper exhibits a duality between the theory of revealed preference of Afriat and the housing allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf. In particular, it is shown that Afriat’s theorem can be interpreted as a second welfare theorem in the housing problem. Using this duality, the revealed...