This paper presents a game where the incumbent firm uses the price as a signal about demand size. Without observing the demand, the regulator has to decide if the entry of new firms will be allowed. The game has a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the incumbent firm chooses the...

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers' transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling (1929). When the transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits than in the case of perfect information. Contrarily, both firms may...

We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the...

This paper relaxes the Motta & Vasconcelos’ (2005) short-term assumption that firms’ capital is fixed. We demonstrate that, contrary to the conclusion of that article, in the best interest of consumers, even when firms have large economies of scale, long-term forward-looking Antitrust...

We study the impact of vertical separation between an upstream firm and its subsidiary, which competes in the retail market with an independent firm, with the incentive to invest in network upgrade. This question is discussed under two alternative regimes concerning the price of the vital input...

In an incomplete regulation framework the Regulator cannot replicate all the possible outcomes by himself since he has no influence on some firms present in the market. When facing asymmetric information regarding the regulated firm’s costs, it may be better for the Regulator to allow the...

In this paper, a general model of strategic behaviour of (regulated and non-regulated) firms in M&A is presented. For non-regulated firms, the model indicates that targeted firms issue new debt strategically. In this case, the firm's capital structure is chosen so that it maximizes the (ex-ante)...

This paper provides an overview of how the major airports are regulated in Europe. In order to eliminate the potential of airports to exercise market power and protect the public interest, it has become increasingly necessary to set a common regulatory framework. We intend to discuss the need of...

We revisit the issue of self-fulfilling “waves of enthusiasm” as stationary rational expectations equilibrium outcomes in endogenous-growth models that merge the quality-ladders with the expanding-variety mechanism. By considering a lab-equipment specification with vertical-innovation...

This paper develops a tournament model of horizontal and vertical R&D under a lab-equipment specification. A key feature is that the overall growth rate is endogenous, as the splitting of the growth rate between the intensive and the extensive margin is itself endogenous. This setup gives rise...