We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network...

We consider agents playing a linear network game with strategic complementarities. We analyse the problem of a policy maker who can change the structure of the network in order to increase the aggregate efforts of the individuals and/or the sum of their utilities, given that the number of links...

A set of agents is organized in a social network, which conveys synergies in two activities. Each agent has one unit of a resource to allocate between two activities. We show that individual choices are shaped by Bonacich centrality measures and an attractiveness multiplier. The latter, combined...

We consider a model of interdependent efforts, with linear and possibly asymmetric interaction. We examine how a variation of the intensity of interaction affects aggregate effort. We show that the relevant information is given by the transposed system.

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with possible decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on the line network. We give conditions under which more central agents...

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first...

We examine how moral hazard impacts risk-sharing when risk-taking can be part of the mechanism design. In a two-agent model with binary effort, we show that moral hazard always increases risk-taking (that is the amount of wealth invested in a risky project) whereas the effect on risk-sharing...

We revisit the common view that risk sharing enhances risk taking in the context of heterogenous risk sharing in a small economy. Under low volumes of transfers, we express individual risk level in terms of Bonacich measure. We find that heterogeneity combined to strategic interaction imply that...

This paper brings into focus a link between the investment and financing decisions of a firm which has an access to costly debt financing. Our analysis shows that lump-sum debt issuance costs play a prominent role in a determination of the optimal investment strategy. Faced with larger lump-sum...

Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques are...