Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.

In response to a drop in collected funds, charitable associations have implemented a rigorous approach to the target decisions and communication for fundraising. Prior studies have shown that manipulating the scale of donations influences the collection results. This study was carried out within...

The present study attempts to understand what makes hoarders agree to give their unwanted possessions away to charity. Our findings indicate that it is important for hoarders 1) to know the profile of the end-recipient (“who is the item going to?”) and 2) to be able to assess the legitimacy...

Managers in the fundraising and public sectors face the constant challenge of soliciting donations from a population who may or may not have donated before. Rather than merely asking respondents what they wish to donate, it is standard practice to present a set of suggested amounts – the...

Prevention policies against flood, such as dams or levees, are commonly designed by local jurisdictions and for most, they exert externalities on neighbouring jurisdictions. We study a model in which each jurisdiction chooses its collective prevention effort depending on the flood risk and on...

The presence of nearby public facility contributes to real-estate’s value, that’s why the market may expect impact of public project on house’s price. But undesirable and semi-desirable facility location choices can be contested by close inhabitants, because they are source of negative...

We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to...

We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the...