Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 98
Cover Image
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003
By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent … convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968398
Cover Image
Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968460
Cover Image
Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology
Goerg, Sebastian; Kube, Sebastian; Ro'i Zultan - University of Bonn, Germany - 2007
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968354
Cover Image
Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability
Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968360
Cover Image
On Delegation under Relational Contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
The benefits and costs of different forms of job design have been analyzed in the literature yet. The focus has thereby mostly been on job designs under formal contracts between the parties. However, in the real world relational contracts - informal agreements sustained by the value of future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968427
Cover Image
Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes
Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010
We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance schemes: If workers’ abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008485509
Cover Image
Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study
Raab, Philippe; Schipper, Burkhard C. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968365
Cover Image
Why People Reject Advantageous Offers – Non-monotone Strategies in Ultimatum Bargaining
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Li, Zhu-Yu; Yang, Chaoliang - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
disadvantageous and advantageous proposals. We report on an ultimatum game video experiment where more than 50 percent of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968355
Cover Image
Experimenting over a Long Distance - A method to facilitate intercultural experiments
Walkowitz, Gari; Oberhammer, Clemens; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
interactive experiments in geographically separated subject pools. Applying ELD to an intercultural trust experiment with … Chinese senders’ discrimination of Argentinean players no discrimination in trust and reciprocity behavior was observed …. Neverthe- less, we found significantly different levels of trust and reciprocity in the different national cultures. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989609
Cover Image
Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kräkel, Matthias; … - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989635