Showing 1 - 10 of 10
We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785819
In this paper, I compare two different approaches to model implicit contracting, the infinite-horizon approach typically used in the literature and afinite-horizon approach building on an adverse-selection model. I demonstrate that even the most convincing result of the infinite-horizon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785797
In this paper, a principal’s decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785829
We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739701
single effects determining the sign of the effort change oftentimes depend on how the supervisor processes information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835209
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785810
In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is analyzed, where each contestant may spend productive effort in order to increase his team's performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that sabotaging the weaker members of a team always decreases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785894
in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate information regarding the agents’ previous performances if these … her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785932
This paper addresses the selection problem in promotion tournaments. I consider a situation with heterogeneous employees and ask whether an employer might be interested in repeating a promotion tournament. On the one hand, this yields a reduction in uncertainty over the employees’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835224
In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the behavior of individuals or firms and that reputation influences the outcome of markets. Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue that a positive reputation of sellers should have an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785862