Showing 1 - 10 of 253
In multi-attribute procurement auctions with multiple objects, the auctioneer may care about the interplay of quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270005
, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263167
, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001502
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263146
It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information about the realization of the other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293376
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. Inparticular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263094
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264920
In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The … optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more … property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263051
This article studies the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown marginal cost. The originality of the paper is to consider that the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263052
We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263050