We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

Contracts often reward inefficient tasks and are not enforced ex post. We provide a new explanation based on the relationship between explicit contracts and implicit agreements, distinguishing the ex-ante decision to sign a contract from the ex-post decision whether to apply it. We show that it...

An agent can choose to forego benefits from side opportunities and to instead provide benefits to the principal. In return, the principal offers rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This model allows the agent's...

Relationships between organizational socialization (OS) tactics and fit perceptions were analyzed, by distinguishing between context, content, and social tactics (Jones, 1986) on the one hand, and person-organization (P-O), person-job (P-J), and person-group (P-G) fit perceptions on the other...

The organizational socialization concept has received an increasing interest from researchers and practitioners. This research focuses on the relationship between socialization levels and tenure. We identify four dimensions of the concept, and develop one hypothesis for each. Two empirical...