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Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns

Hoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784708

Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

Bourreau, Marc; Kourandi, Frago; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083479

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines … that over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of LLU. However, unbundling has little or no … technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter-platform competition has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

Input Price Discrimination with Downstream Cournot Competitors

Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper addresses the question of third-degree price discrimination in input markets. I propose a solution that relies on a method that decomposes the upstream monopolist’s profit into two parts, one that depends on average input prices, and one that depends on their distribution. I am able...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792467

Intertemporal movie distribution: Versioning when customers can buy both versions

Calzada, Joan; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We study a model of film production, distribution and consumption. The studio can release two goods, a theatrical and a video version, and has to decide on its versioning and sequencing strategy. In contrast with the previous literature, we allow for the possibility that consumers watch both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854538

Parallel Trade, International Exhaustion and Intellectual Property Rights: A Welfare Analysis

Szymanski, Stefan; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper analyses the issue of parallel trade (arbitrage) for products protected by intellectual property rights. Many countries have traditionally allowed owners of intellectual property rights to prohibit arbitrage in the face of international price discrimination. In a well-known paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791206

Universal Service and Entry: the Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Hoernig, Steffen; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

entrant may be lower than without regulation, and firms may even (noncooperatively) leave each others' markets to lessen …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791691

Market Structure, Countervailing Power and Price Discrimination: The Case of Airports

Haskel, Jonathan; Iozzi, Alberto; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We study bargained input prices where up and downstream firms can choose alternative vertical partners. We apply our model to airport landing fees where a number of interesting policy questions have arisen. For example, what is the impact of joint ownership of airports? Does airline...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854469

First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

Szymanski, Stefan; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Most of the contest literature deals with first prizes; this Paper deals with the optimality of second prizes. We show that in a three-person contest where one contestant is very strong a second prize can be optimal from the point of view of eliciting maximum effort from every contestant....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791735

Location Choice and Price Discrimination in a Duopoly

Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper analyzes the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over both a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). A model with two firms competing over locations and non-linear contracts is analyzed. Discriminatory contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792220