Similar Search Results

Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084279

Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives

Meyer, Margaret A; Vickers, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal-agent relationships by improving the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791400

Joint Production in Teams

Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765

Teamwork Management in an Era of Diminishing Commitment

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Friebel, Guido; Pechlivanos, Lambros - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

desired level of cooperation. Moreover, teamwork exposes agents to higher risks than the ones they are exposed to in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792112

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Delegated Job Design

Hvide, Hans K; Kaplan, Todd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers, and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by choosing difficult tasks. Such signalling provides a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123930

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power’ approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment

Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers’ effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083724

Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency

Burgess, Simon; Propper, Carol; Ratto, Marisa; Tominey, Emma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper addresses a lack of evidence on the impact of performance pay in the public sector by evaluating a pilot scheme of incentives in a major government agency. The incentive scheme was based on teams and covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084487