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Holden, Helge; Holden, Lars; Holden, Steinar - 2005

Consider a contract over trade in continuous time between two players, according to which one player makes a payment to the other, in exchange for an exogenous service. At each point in time, either player may unilaterally require an adjustment of the contract payment, involving adjustment costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261197

Race Meets Bargaining in Product Development

Karagözoğlu, Emin - 2020

the new product using the normatively appealing Nash bargaining solution (see Nash, 1950). In our model the disagreement … payoffs endogenously depend on the contest outcome. More precisely, a bargaining advantage is given to the leading worker in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841137

Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts

Wärneryd, Karl - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435790

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2004

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261280

Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - 2022

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082238

International Trade and Stable Resolutions of Resource Disputes

Garfinkel, Michelle Robin; Syropoulos, Constantinos - 2022

We consider a dynamic setting in which two sovereign states with overlapping ownership claims on a resource/asset ﬁrst arm and then choose whether to resolve their dispute violently through war or peacefully through settlement. Both approaches depend on the states’ military capacities, but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243081

Trade, Insecurity, and the Costs of Conflict

Garfinkel, Michelle Robin; Skaperdas, Stergios; … - 2022

Typically, economics assumes that property rights over productive resources or goods are perfectly defined and costlessly enforced. The costs of insecurity and the resultant conflict are, however, real and often economically significant. In this paper, we examine how international trade regimes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243087

A stochastic multiple players multi-issues bargaining model for the Piave river basin

Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - 2007

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of … multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of … problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264274

A new approach to solving production-appropriation games with many heterogeneous players

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger; Tamura, Yuji - 2010

We set out a model of production and appropriation involving many players, who differ with respect to both resource endowments and productivities. We write down the model in a novel way that permits our analysis to avoid the proliferation of dimensions associated with the best response function...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270524

The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004

indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261094