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Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270502
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Balanced Scorecards : A Relational Contract Approach
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2021
performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …. The weights reflect a trade-off between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243235
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The Pygmalion effect : an agency model with reference dependent preferences
Daido, Kohei; Itoh, Hideshi - 2005
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261169
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Social relations and relational incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - 2012
each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282065
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Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents
Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen - 2008
motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264451
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Learning from Failures : Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production
Khalil, Fahad - 2019
derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892041
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Motivation and Incentives in an Online Labor Market
Fest, Sebastian - 2019
In this paper we present results from a large scale real effort experiment in an online labor market investigating the effect of performance pay and two common leadership techniques: Positive expectations and specific goals. We find that positive expectations have a significant negative effect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891569
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Attention-Driven Demand for Bonus Contracts
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus - 2019
, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890631
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Pay Transparency Under Subjective Performance Evaluation
Fahn, Matthias; Zanarone, Giorgio - 2021
This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using “subjective performance evaluation”). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an “envy premium”....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250033
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Effort and Selection Effects of Performance Pay in Knowledge Creation
Ytsma, Erina - 2022
The effects of performance pay in routine, easy to measure tasks are well-documented, but they are much less understood in knowledge creation. This paper studies the effects of explicit and implicit, career concerns incentives common in knowledge work in a multitasking model, and estimates their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014264447