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model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment … and monitoring activities. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on the net wage isambiguous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405856
of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and … monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406375
This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal non-linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that … the joint determination of the non-linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be … implemented. Monitoring of labor effort reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877903
unemployed to front-load search effort prior to monitoring. This causes the job finding rate to increase above the post sanction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371346
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither … the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient … condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752436
. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727277
monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager’s compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094257
Rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. This raises the question whether a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion can still be useful in providing incentives. By highlighting the role of team work in forging information, we present a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765652
charge of project selection and the supervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765820