In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage setting in which wages are determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in the...

In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage setting in which wages are determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in the...

Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide a social good in addition to a private good, which makes it difficult for a government to commit not to bail out the firm once it is in financial trouble. This creates a soft budget constraint syndrome which causes the...

In this paper, we analyze the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in...

The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions. We consider a sample of 164 EU merger control decisions and evaluate the anti-competitive consequences of these mergers from the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to the merging firms....

This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency while making lobbying less effective also implies real resource costs. We examine the performance of two alternative standards that can be...

This paper examines the asymptotic (in)efficiency of Stackelberg markets with incomplete information. Firms who are early in the queue make their quantity choices based on limited information and their output choices are likely to deviate from those optimal under complete information. Due to the...

R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government’s R&D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm’s bargaining power over the licensing gain. When the firm’s bargaining power is...

This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation policy using European data on obstacles to innovation. We propose a discrete test of supermodularity in innovation policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. We apply our test to two types of...

This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in...