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Professional associations and other producer groups often complain that their reputation is damaged by other groups providing a similar but lower-quality service and that the latter should be regulated. We examine the conditions under which a common regulatory regime can induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647378
Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make ex ante transfers the revelation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647422
The paper studies a general model of hold-up in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modelled as an infinite-horizon non-cooperative bargaining game then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647453
According to standard theory, the set of implementable outcome functions is reduced if the mechanism or contract can be renegotiated ex post. In some cases contracts can achieve nothing and so, for example, the holdup problem may be severe. This paper shows that if the mechanism is designed in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005650521
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207836
We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113831
How are state-owned entreprises to be reformed? Privatisation seems to be the obvious solution. This essay argues that entreprises reform in the transition should focus on enhancing managerial.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489296
In the evolutionary setting for a financial market developed by Blume and Easley (1992) the author considers an infinitely repeated version of a model B la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) with asymmetrically informed traders. Informed traders observe the realisation of a payoff relevant signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489297
In this paper we examine the spatial and temporal distribution of per capita income across Europe. We base our analysis on a cluster methodology which allows for an endogenous selection of regional clusters using a multivariate test for stationarity where the number and composition of clusters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489298
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489299