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Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome
Sabourian, Hamid - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000
are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching and bargaining game should be the unique competitive equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593559
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On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
Quint, Thomas; Wake, Jun - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762743
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Matching with Incomplete Information
Liu, Quingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically assumes that the agents have complete information, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686932
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The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762670
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The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006
A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762688
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Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments
Qin, Chen-Zhong; Shapley, Lloyd S.; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009
A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008479208
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Exchange and Optimality
Ghosal, S.; Polemarchakis, Heracles M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996
A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals with two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593635
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The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade
Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party … equilibrium payoffs. Our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment on the bargaining process. In particular …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011075769
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The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade
Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
observing a given offer. We further characterize the equilibrium payoffs that can be achieved in the bargaining game in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456248
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Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games
Pearce, David G.; Abreu, Dilip; Stacchetti, Ennio - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1989
process of negotiation and renegotiation as events unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining power … troublesome. Whatever its source, bargaining power is presumably the same for all players in a symmetric game. We take equal … bargaining power to mean that a player can mount a credible objection to a continuation equilibrium in which he receives a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593208