Savage motivated his Sure Thing Principle by arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if that event did not obtain, then it should be preferred overall. The idea that it should be possible to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has...

What is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information, and her attitude towards risk? If an agent always prefers more information, does this imply that she obeys the independence axiom? We provide a substitution property on preferences that is equivalent to the agent...

We compare the Skiadas approach with the standard Savage framework of choice under uncertainty. At first glance, properties of Skiadas "conditional preferences" such as coherence and disappointment seem analogous to similarly motivated notions of decomposability and disappointment aversion...

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we...

We provide an axiomatization of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's problem such that lotteries over identity (accidents of birth) and lotteries over outcomes (life chances) are...

We consider an single object auction environment with interdependent valuations and a generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves allocation mechanism that allocates the object almost efficiently in a strict ex post equilibrium. If there is a significant amount of interdependence, there are multiple...

Market participants' risk attitudes, wealth and portfolio composition influence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and, therefore, may have important effects on the sustainability of currency pegs. We analyze such effects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action...

We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponentÌs private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue equivalence between...

In a financial market where traders are risk averse and short lived, and prices are noisy, asset prices today depend on the average expectation today of tomorrow's price. Thus (iterating this relationship) the date 1 price equals the date 1 average expectation of the date 2 average expectation...

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. Weidentify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicityno veto...