Showing 1 - 10 of 63
Agents with reciprocal preferences prefer to be matched to a partner who also likes to collaborate with them. In this paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for mechanism design. Formally, the preferences of an agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467722
The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise is the assumption that agents know their own preferences at the outset and that preferences do not change throughout the matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012141864
We study the allocation of German lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee-ships. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated. The currently used \"Berlin\" mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932933
This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282923
In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197543
Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that thereare several possible states of nature, each of which is identied with abargaining problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869345
This paper provides an analysis of individual and social decision criteria foralternatives that are composed of several attributes. We derive additive and multiplicativecriteria for individual decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria toobtain new justications of known social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869346
We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266322
Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236059
This paper introduces the matched-bet mechanism. The matched bet is an easily applicable and strictly budget-balanced mechanism that aims to help people overcome time-inconsistent behavior. I show theoretically that offering a matched bet helps both sophisticated and naive procrastinators to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467778