How to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision-maker who faces uncertainty?This paper suggests some compensation rules.These are studied both in a cooperative and a noncooperative environment.

This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...

AMS classifications: 90D12; 03E72;

In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex...

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also...

In this paper we introduce multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) games. An MLTS game arises from a network in which a salesman has to visit each node (player) precisely once, except its home location, in an order that maximizes the total reward.First it is shown that the value of a...

For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept.Convexity can be defined in a number of ways, each having its own specific attractions.Basically, these definitions fall into two categories, namely those based on a...