Showing 1 - 8 of 8
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556728
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543763
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739676
We study non-binding procurement auctions where both price and non-price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. The outcome of such auctions critically depends on how information is distributed among bidders during the bidding process. As we show theoretically, whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773842
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest. After the contest,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583545
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011093297
This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency’s optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140980
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer’s problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008855232