This study extends the multi-country, politico-economic model of fiscal policy developed by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) to incorporate wage inequality within each country. In this extended framework, we present conflict within and across generations over fiscal policy and show that...

This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero- geneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game...

This paper presents a politico-economic model that includes a mutual link between life cycle earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates that when an economy features a high opportunity of upward mobility and high risk of downward mobility, it attains a unique...

This paper presents a simple model that displays a joint determination of income inequality and intergenerational mobility affected by redistributive taxation. The model shows that a larger redistribution improves equality and utility and enhances mobility when the poor are financially...

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of public policy via individual decision-making. The paper extends the model in Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2007, Journal of Economic Theory; henceforth HSZ) by generalizing the cost function of education and...

This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of redistribution policy via individual decision-making on education. For cases of high costs, there are multiple equilibria: the high-tax equilibrium featured by the minority of highly educated individuals and a large...

In this study, we ask why countries with similar labor market characteristics experience different occupational mobility levels and redistribution policies. We develop a politico-economic model that integrates occupational mobility affected by individual educational investments with voting on...

This paper develops a model where income inequality and intergenerational mo- bility are jointly determined via redistributive politics. The model includes two key factors: accessibility of tertiary education for poor-born agents and multiple self- ful?lling expectations of agents. Given these...

This paper presents a politico-economic model including a mutual link between earnings mobility and redistribution policy affected by human capital risk. A lowrisk economy produces multiple equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium with lower mobility and higher redistribution and a rich-majority...