It is known (see, e.g., Weibull in Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1995</CitationRef>) that an evolutionarily stable strategy is not necessarily robust against multiple mutations. Precise definition and analysis of “evolutionarily stable strategy against multiple mutations” are not available in the...</citationref>

Evolutionary game theory is an increasingly important way to model the evolution of biological populations. Many early models were in the form of matrix games, or bi-matrix games in asymmetric situations when individuals occupy distinct roles within the contest, where rewards are accrued through...

We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...

Trust is essential in virtually all economic interactions. In this paper, we build on previous work analyzing the “trust game” from the perspective of evolutionary dynamics. There are two players: an “investor” and a “trustee.” The investor begins with one monetary unit and can...

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently,...

In models of evolution and learning in games, a variety of proofs of convergence rely on the assumption that the players’ choice functions are integrable. This assumption does not have an obvious game-theoretic interpretation. We address this question by introducing probability models defined...

Mutualistic interactions among members of different species are common, seemingly stable, and thus apparently enduring. This is at odds with standard mathematical models based solely on between-species interactions, which show mutualisms to be inherently unstable. Models incorporating parameters...

We discuss combined effects of stochasticity and time delays in finite-population three-player games with two mixed Nash equilibria and a pure one. We show that if basins of attraction of the stable interior equilibrium and the stable pure one are equal, then an arbitrary small time delay makes...