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A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to...
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Auctioneers often face the decision of whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction (or any other revenue equivalent auction form) there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370871
This paper considers a uniform-price auction in which each of n symmetric bidders can place, say, M bids. Each bidder has privately known, decreasing marginal values from an arbitrary M -dimensional distribution. We provide a quantile-type description of the asymptotic price that appropriately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596762
Shill bidding has increased substantially in recent years since the technology employed to conduct on-line auctions enables many sellers to disguise their identities and bid. Although their intent is to gain by misleading the bidders on the value of the object, we show that in a common value...
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