The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable utility cooperative game. We provide here an exhaustive determination of the bargaining set of any three-player game, balanced or not,...

In this paper, we study values for TU-games which satisfy three classical properties: Linearity, efficiency and symmetry. We give the general analytical form of these values and their relation with the Shapley value and the Egalitarian value.

We characterize binary decision rules which are independent and strongly paretian,or independent and almost strongly paretian when the individual preferences and the collective preference are weak orders.

In this paper, we study values for TU-games which satisfy three classical properties: Linearity, efficiency and symmetry. We give the general analytical form of these values and their relation with the Shapley value and the Egalitarian value.

In this paper we study the vulnerability of parliamentary voting procedures to strategic candidacy. Candidates involved in an election are susceptible to influence the outcome by opting out or opting in. In the context of three-alternative elections and under the impartial anonymous culture...