This study considers the choice of ownership as a continuous variable, thereby adapting the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) theory of the firm. To do so, it is assumed that parties sign a contract that enables them to divide and use assets even after the negotiation over gains of trade fails. I show...

This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental investigation of this result might be interesting.

This note examines the endogenous determination of participation costs in a costly voting game with complete information when there are three voters. I Â…find that there are two types of equilibria: (1) one where a voter who has a minority opinion definitely abstains, and (2) where he or she...

This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental investigation of this result might be interesting.