We analyze the incentives for technology transfer between two firms in a market characterized by a logit demand framework. The available licensing policies of the incumbent innovator are the up front fee, royalty and two-part tariff policies. We show that when the market is covered there is no...

We analyze the incentives for technology transfer between two firms in a market characterized by a logit demand framework. The available licensing policies of the incumbent innovator are the up front fee, royalty and two-part tariff policies. We show that when the market is covered there is no...

A Cournot oligopoly with at least three firms is considered, where one of the firms has a cost-reducing innovation. A general version of royalty contract is proposed, and it is shown that this contract enables the innovator firm to earn the monopoly profit with the reduced cost.

A Cournot oligopoly with at least three firms is considered, where one of the firms has a cost-reducing innovation. A general version of royalty contract is proposed, and it is shown that this contract enables the innovator firm to earn the monopoly profit with the reduced cost.