Showing 1 - 10 of 125
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215253
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219142
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190075
simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157261
Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012711495
We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219141
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019277
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136169
We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players' payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114554
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153794