This paper investigates algorithmic computability of simple games (voting games). It shows that (i) games with a finite carrier are computable, (ii) computable games have both finite winning coalitions and cofinite losing coalitions, and (iii) computable games violate any conceivable notion of...

We study how individuals divide themselves into coalitions and choose a public alternative for each coalition. When preferences have consecutive support and coalition feasible sets are positively population- responsive, the proposed consecutive benevolence solution generates allocations...

Many local public goods are provided by coalitions and some of them have network effects. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a coalition with more members. This paper adopts the Drèze and Greenberg (1980) type utility function where players have preferences over goods as well as...

This paper suggests a reason, other than asymmetric information, why agency contracts are not explicitly contingent on the agent's performance or actions. Two ingredients are essential to this reason. The first is the written form that contracts are required to take to be enforceable. The second...

It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be...

A formal scheme is described for coalition formation in a game of interconnected participants with monotonic utility functions. Special coalitions are studied which have an advantage over the rest in the sense of higher utility for each of the participants taken separately.

We define the canonical form of a cost spanning tree problem. The canonical form has the property that reducing the cost of any arc, the minimal cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced. We argue that the canonical form is a relevant concept in this kind of problems and study a...

An expanded model of value in cooperative games is presented in which value has either a linear or a proportional mode, and NTU value has either an input or an output basis. In TU games, the modes correspond to the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (2000)) values. In...

It is now almost a common truth that society needs to avoid environment contamination or damage become significant for nature protection programs of the government and wild life preservation efforts. A possible outcome of such efforts might occasionally be a voluntary solution, which results...

In this paper the random order approach to values of non-atomic games is reformulated by generating random orders from a fixed subgroup of automorphisms, $\Theta$ that admits an invariant probability measurable group structure. The resulting $\Theta$-symmetric random order value operator is...