Similar Search Results

An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods

Kung, Fan-chin - EconWPA - 2004

We study the formation of coalitions that provide public goods to members. Individuals are linked on a tree graph and those with similar preferences are connected on the tree. We present a solution that selects allocations belonging to the coalition structure core and that are also envy-free.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407611

Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict

Manzini, Paola; Ponsati, Clara - EconWPA - 2003

The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407596

Gradual Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda: A Path-Dependent Model

Arevalo, Julian J. - EconWPA - 2005

This article proposes a method for considering the bargaining agenda as an endogenous phenomenon in gradual bargaining … games, understood as being path-dependent processes. Some short, medium and long-term results for bargaining are presented …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550892

TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES

Akin, Zafer - EconWPA - 2005

-inconsistent players in a sequential bargaining model. We first consider 'naive' agents who never learn about their types and show that … bargaining between such a player and a standard exponential agent ends in immediate agreement. The more naive a player, the … explanation for delays in bargaining. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550915

Bargaining with an Agenda

O'Neill, Barry; Samet, Dov; Wiener, Zvi; Winter, Eyal - EconWPA - 2001

We propose a new framework for bargaining in which the process follows an agenda. The agenda is represented by a family … \emph{bargaining solution} for an agenda specifies a path of agreements, one for each time. We characterize axiomatically a …. It can be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining process in which the agreement point of the last negotiation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118569

The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities

Frijters, Paul; Tieman, Alexander F. - EconWPA - 1999

In this paper we consider the way in which authorities arise in response to the need for coordination. In a model of local interaction, an authority is understood as a self-enforcing coordination selection structure, where the threat of violence ensures compliance. Such authorities form if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550871

Capital account Liberalization and exchange rate regime choice, What Scope for flexibility in Tunisia ?

Sami, Ben Ali Mohamed - EconWPA - 2005

Capital account liberalization and exchange rate regime choice, what scope for flexibility in Tunisia? The adoption by Tunisia of structural reforms of its economy in a context of gradual opening since 1986, had allowed the instauration in January 1993 of the convertibility of its current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407508

What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah - EconWPA - 2003

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407510

Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms

Ledyard, John O.; Palfrey, Thomas R. - EconWPA - 1994

This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed size projects, where the distribution of the private good, as well as the public goods decision, affects social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407511

On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games

Hillas, John - EconWPA - 1996

This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form is necessarily proper. If one fixes not only the equilibrium in question but also a a sequence of completely mixed strategies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407514