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Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction

Hart, Sergiu - EconWPA - 1999

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407617

A General Class of Adaptive Strategies

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - EconWPA - 1999

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan- consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550971

Evolution in Symmetric Incomplete Information Games

Amann, Erwin; Possajennikov, Alex - EconWPA - 2004

evolve. In the case of two types and two strategies it is shown that the stability properties of stationary states are the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118573

On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation

Haag, Matthew; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2002

This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how "much" cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062386

Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning

Haag, Matthew; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 1999

This paper examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Individuals differ across rates of time preference. A planner must choose a local interaction system or neighborhood design before observing the realization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550940

Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution

Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael; Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1998

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for $k$ periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118533

Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions

Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2005

Perfect equilibria of dynamic political games. The present paper examines issues of stability and reform when such equilibria … exist. Which environments tend toward institutional stability? Which tend toward reform? We show that when political rules … decisions alone. More generally, we identify sufficient conditions for stability and reform in terms of recursive self selection …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062355

Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in the Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets

Unver, M. Utku - EconWPA - 1999

. As an interesting result, it is demonstrated that stability need not be required for the success of a matching mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550908

Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets

Rigotti, Luca; Chris Shannon=20 - EconWPA - 2002

This paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the=20 distinction between un-certainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents= =20 have incomplete preferences over state-contingent consumption bundles, as=20 in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, individual decision making...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118598

A Framework for Studying Economic Interactions (with applications to corruption and business cycles)

Verbrugge, Randal J. - EconWPA - 1998

Most economic models implicitly or explicitly assume that interactions between economic agents are 'global' - in other words, each agent interacts in a uniform manner with every other agent. However, localized interactions between microeconomic agents are a pervasive feature of reality. What are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407546