Showing 1 - 10 of 146
number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609
While many learning models have been proposed in the game theoretic literature to track individuals’ behavior … learning models in light of a laboratory experiment on responsiveness in a lowinformation dynamic game subject to changes in … its underlying structure. While history-dependent reinforcement learning models track convergence of play well in repeated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062390
purification with recent results from the rational learning literature. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541
of evolutionary and learning processes in this game. Only the continuous best response dynamic uniquely selects the … Stackelberg outcome under noise. All other dynamics analyzed allow for the Cournot equilibrium to be selected. In typical cases … Cournot is the unique long run outcome even for vanishing noise in the signal. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550927
Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there …, (ii) the resulting efficiency loss, and (iii) the adjustment of the learning rule. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575
(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407571
We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601
We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603
In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407608
This paper applies the theory of equilibrium in mixed strategies in an inspection game model to describe the strategic interaction in the stolen base play in baseball. A parsimonious simultaneous-move game model offers predictions about how the observable conduct of the teams on offense and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062357