Showing 1 - 10 of 61
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game … induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049696
Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931197
We analyzed the market for indivisible, pure status goods. Firms produce and sell different brands of pure status goods to a population that is willing to signal individual abilities to potential matches in another population. Individual status is determined by the most expensive status good one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719494
Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school … as social planners whose goal is to maximize the overall ex-ante welfare of the students. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577249
This paper investigates the welfare effects of affirmative action policies in school choice. We show that affirmative … affirmative action policies inevitably hurt every minority student – the purported beneficiaries – under any stable matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577242
mechanism to derive them. In this paper, we re-examine the priority matching. First, we consider a general priority ordering … set of priority matchings. Moreover, we provide an efficient method to find a priority matching. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117129
We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only to an agentʼs choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049779
Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor–patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider the quality of the matches between patients and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049781
misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049837
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049866