Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each...

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

Interpersonal consistency can be described in epistemic terms as a property of beliefs, or in economic terms as the impossibility of certain trades. The existence of a common prior from which all agentsʼ beliefs are derived is of the first kind. The non-existence of an agreeable bet, that is, a...

We study Blackwell's approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs when the approaching player is restricted to use strategies with bounded memory: either strategies with bounded recall, or strategies that can be implemented by finite automata. Our main finding is that the following...

Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on the actual state of nature. These signals provide the players with partial information about the state of nature and may also serve as a...