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leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268001
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268002
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a “good” allocation of effort across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566602
We follow workers' performance along an unbalanced panel dataset over multiple years and study how performance varies at the end of fixed-term contracts, in a labour market where some people face a mobility restricting clause (i.e., a noncompete clause). Focusing on the labour market of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014533987
In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262723
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331
of information to future employers and sharpen incentives. Using a simple moral hazard model, we demonstrate that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267497
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269938
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278365