Some vignettes from the career of Professor Bezalel Peleg. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays against an unrestricted player. An exogenously given bound on the complexity of strategies, which is measured by the size of the smallest automata that implement them, gives rise to a restriction on...

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

We prove here the existence of a value (of norm 1) on the spaces ′N A and even ′A N, the closure in the variation distance of the linear space spanned by all games f∘μ, where μ is a non-atomic, non-negative finitely additive measure of mass 1 and f a real-valued function on [0,1] which...

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game...

Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or "player." One is interested not only in each person's knowledge and beliefs about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge and beliefs about the others' knowledge and beliefs....