The random preference, Fechner (or "white noise"), and constant error (or "tremble") models of stochastic choice under risk are compared. Various combinations of these approaches are used with expected utility and rank-dependent theory. The resulting models are estimated in a random effects...

We present a new theory of decision under uncertainty: third-generation prospect theory (PT3). This retains the predictive power of previous versions of prospect theory, but extends that theory by allowing reference points to be uncertain while decision weights are specified in a rank-dependent...

Several theories explain the common ratio effect as probability effect resulting from properties of individuals' preference ordering over probability distributions of consequences. In contrast, regret theory explains it as the result of changes in the juxtaposition of consequences in the...

Regret theory predicts that choices over prospects will be systematically influenced by the juxtaposition of outcomes in the payoff matrix. Experiments have found apparent juxtaposition effects of this kind. However, these experiments have not controlled for "event-splitting effects" (ESEs), by...

A decision maker's attitude towards risk is said to be of order (i), (i) = 1, 2, if for every given risk (e) with expected value zero, the risk premium the decision maker is willing to pay to avoid the risk (te) goes with (t) to zero at the same order as t[superscript i]. This article presents...

Much of the evidence raising doubts about expected utility theory (EUT) comes from experiments involving hypothetical decisions. Most of the rest of the evidence comes from experiments where respondents are asked to make a large number of decisions, knowing that only one of these will provide...

<Para ID="Par1">We propose a broad framework for individual choice under risk which can accommodate many stochastic formulations of various deterministic theories. Using this framework to guide an experimental design, we show that most individuals’ departures from the independence axiom cannot be explained by...</para>