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Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence

De Luca, Giacomo; Sekeris, Petros; Spengler, Dominic - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

While folk theorems for dynamic renewable common pool resource games sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262754

Evolution of vulnerability to pain in interpersonal relations as a strategic trait aiding cooperation

Rtischev, Dimitry - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

fosters cooperation. We study a population comprised of "thick-skinned" and "thin-skinned" agents by using an indirect … evolution model that combines rational choice in strategic interactions with evolutionary selection across generations. We find … ways in which rationality hinders the evolution of the relatively vulnerable and peaceful type of agent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008526974

The 15-years-long emergency, the burial-of-the-dead conflict and the ultimatum game.

Villani, Salvatore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258906

Are Kant's categorical imperative and instrumental rationality incompatible? The case for the prisoner's dilemma

Brinca, Pedro - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

Why is good good and bad bad? Kant's categorical imperative (KCI) and instrumental rationality are analyzed under the game-theoretical framework of the folk theorem. Prescribing different courses of action under the one-shot game, Kant's categorical imperative emerges as instrumentally rational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170133

King of the Hill Positional Dynamics in Contests

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Kalle - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616742

L’emergenza dei tre lustri, la salma contesa e il gioco dell’Ultimatum. Alcune riflessioni sui problemi che caratterizzano le decisioni pubbliche in Italia

Villani, Salvatore - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Negli ultimi tempi, fra gli studiosi dei processi di formazione delle scelte pubbliche è in corso un interessante dibattito volto ad individuare le tecniche più appropriate per gestire in maniera efficace (ovvero in tempi rapidi e garantendo la stabilità e la durevolezza delle decisioni o...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876650

On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

Boudreau, James W.; Shunda, Nicholas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008615029

Endowment as a blessing

Frenkel, Sivan; Heller, Yuval; Teper, Roee - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Experimental evidence and field data suggest that agents hold two seemingly unrelated biases: failure to account for the fact that the behavior of others reflects their private information (“winner's curse”), and a tendency to value a good more once it is owned (“endowment effect”). In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259069

Civilization and the evolution of short sighted agents

Basuchoudhary, Atin; Allen, Sam; Siemers, Troy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We model an assurance game played within a population with two types of individuals -- short-sighted and foresighted. Foresighted people have a lower discount rate than short sighted people. These phenotypes interact with each other. We define the persistent interaction of foresighted people...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790237

Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?

Villena, Mauricio G.; Villena, Marcelo J. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

evolutionary game theory (EGT). We shed some light on the potential contribution of Veblen's theory of socioeconomic evolution to … it can be applied as a tool for analyzing issues on the diversity, interaction, and evolution of social systems, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839503