On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable strategies.

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Year of publication:	2010-08-25
Authors:	Boudreau, James W. ; Shunda, Nicholas
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Contest \| Prize valuation \| Preference evolution \| Evolutionarily stable preferences

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008615029