Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise

We analyze the determinants of tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with noise in the contest success function. Sustaining collusion via Nash reversion strategies is easier the more noise there is, and is more difficult the larger is the contest's prize value. An increase in the contest's number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less difficult.

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Year of publication:	2015-07-17
Authors:	Boudreau, James W. ; Shunda, Nicholas

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Boudreau, James W. and Shunda, Nicholas (2015): Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise.
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015248409