Similar Search Results

Jovanovic, Boyan - 1996

re-negotiated. Foreseeing this, the parties to the contract will write one that is renegotiation-proof. Under such a … contract, nominal shocks affect real consumption. Since the argument should apply in many situations, it will have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473208

On the Role of Learning, Human Capital, and Performance Incentives for Wages

Camargo, Braz; Lange, Fabian; Pastorino, Elena - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

Performance pay in general amounts to only a small fraction of total pay. In this paper, we show that performance pay is nevertheless important for the level and dynamics of wages over the life cycle because of the incentives it indirectly provides for human capital acquisition and because of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334409

Incentive Contracts

Lazear, Edward P. - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477157

A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts

Green, Jerry R. - 1982

Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478271

Optimal Employment Contracts with Hidden Search

Lentz, Rasmus - 2014

In this paper I explore optimal employment contract design in a random search framework, where workers search on and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458676

Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence

Gibbons, Robert - 1991

. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives -- the combination of … the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the … explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement. We find …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475208

Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts

Lazear, Edward P. - 1979

This paper analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in an organization rather than his output level. When workers are risk neutral, it is shown that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources as an incentive reward scheme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478746

Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?

Holden, Richard T. - 2019

Two parties sign a contract but before they fully perform they modify the contract. Should courts enforce the modified … to write a contract that is robust to hold-up or that makes the facts relevant to modification verifiable. But … contract technology, e.g., the use of liquidated damages, to ensure commitment are disfavored by courts and subject to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479782

Wage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675)

Green, Jerry R. - 1981

This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478500

Courts and Relational Contracts

Johnson, Simon - 2001

Post-communist countries offer new evidence on the relative importance of courts and relationships in enforcing contracts. Belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significant positive effect on the level of trust shown in new relationships between firms and their customers. Well-functioning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470146