Showing 1 - 10 of 163
This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333976
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334157
post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010520618
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333792
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334002
We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334081
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333766
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333722
of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333759
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333774